We study electoral rule choice in a multi-party model with o¢ ce-motivated parties and electoral outcome uncertainty. We show that when all dominant parties (parties with positive probability of winning the elections) have su¢ ciently good chances of winning, then they agree to change the PR-rule with a more majoritarian one in order to increase their chances of forming a single-party government. We identify the exact degree of disproportionality of the new rule and we prove that it is increasing in the expected vote share of the minority parties (parties with zero probability of winning). The necessary and su¢ cient conditions for such collusion in favor of a majoritarian rule are: a) the high rents from a single-party government, b) su¢ cient uncertainty over the electoral outcome and c) ideological proximity of the dominant parties. Under mild conditions, we show that a unique and dynamically stable electoral reform equilibrium exist. Our predictions are supported by empirical evidence.
Introduction
The choice of the electoral rule is a strategic decision of major importance, made in every democracy, since it sets the rules of the game. In terms of policy implementation, more important than the electoral outcome itself, is the allocation of parliamentary seats in the legislature, according to the applied electoral rule. This is so, because the ability of any government, single-party or coalition one, to implement its policies critically depends on the size of its parliamentary majority.
Hence, the number of parliamentary seats allocated to the winner is a signi…cant determinant of political power (Blais, 1991) . Under a Proportional Representation rule (hereinafter PR), a party that secures a very large vote share can sometimes fail to capture the absolute parliamentary majority, whereas, under a more majoritarian rule (such as First-Past-The-Post) it could have been easier for an o¢ ce-motivated party, simply by securing the parliamentary majority, to form a single-party government and enjoy the spoils of o¢ ce alone, or advance its policy agenda facing less opposition in the parliament (Blais, 1991; Tsebelis, 1999) . It is exactly this feature of nonproportional electoral rules, to distort the allocation of parliamentary seats in favour of the largest parties, that generates incentives for strategic electoral rule choice.
Of course, one can argue that non-proportional electoral rules are deemed to be unfair and as such, they are rejected by the political systems. Yet, a closer inspection reveals that in many countries electoral rules other than pure PR are actually applied in order to transform votes into parliamentary seats (Norris, 1997) . Moreover, in the last forty years many majoritarian electoral rule reforms were enacted (Riera, 2012) . With these observations in mind, a set of interesting questions arise. Firstly, how strategic considerations and opportunistic incentives a¤ect parties' decisions vis-à-vis electoral rule change? Secondly, which electoral rule do parties choose, given their expected vote share in the forthcoming elections? Finally, what are the key determinants of electoral rule choice? Only strategic (opportunistic) calculations matter, or does ideology play an equally important role?
To answer these questions, we develop a model of multi-party electoral competition with two, o¢ ce-motivated, dominant parties and uncertainty over the electoral outcome. In such a framework, we model electoral rule choice endogenously, as an optimal, strategic decision made by the parties 1 , through a parliamentary voting procedure, within the context of uncertain electoral competition. To put it more simply, in this paper we will try to explain why and how parties choose the rules of the game. We will also present some stylized empirical evidence to support its theoretical predictions.
Recent Literature
Duverger's (1954) famous law 2 postulates that it is the electoral rule, determined exogenously by some pre-existing constitutional arrangement, which is responsible for shaping the political landscape and the structure of the party-system. Recently, a number of scholars have gone in the opposite direction. Turning Duverger upside down, Colomer (2005) presents and tests the hypothesis that it is, in fact, the number of parties that can explain the choice of electoral rules. He argues that existing political parties tend to choose electoral systems that allow them to " [C] rystallize, consolidate and reinforce the current party system instead of changing it dramatically." He also concludes that political systems that are dominated by few parties tend to establish majoritarian electoral rules.
Boix (1999) also suggests that the existing variation in electoral rules across parliamentary democracies is due to the strategic decisions that ruling parties make, anticipating the coordinating consequences of di¤erent electoral rules, in order to maximize their representation in the legislature.
He …nds that, if the electoral competition is less uncertain and the existing electoral rule serves the current ruling parties then, status-quo bias prevails and parties have limited incentives to modify the electoral rule. However, if the degree of uncertainty increases due to new voters, or change in their preferences, the ruling parties will consider changing the current electoral rule depending on two conditions: Firstly, the strength of the other parties, and secondly, the coordinating capabilities of the dominant parties. Similarly, if the new entrants are expected to be weak, a non-proportional rule is maintained regardless of the structure of the old political system. We note that, although 1 In line with Ansolabehere and Snyder (2006) who consider that ruling parties control the ‡ow of public funding, we consider that ruling parties in ‡uence electoral reforms as opposed to studies which assume that institutions are directly formed by the citizens (see for example Barbera and Jackson 2004 and Jack and Laguno¤ 2006) . 2 Riker states it as follows: "Simple majority rules favor bipartisanship whereas, proportional and simple majority two-round electoral rules favor multi-partism." it is out of the scope of this paper to explicitly model new party entry, our theoretical model is, nonetheless, robust to alternative interpretations and can account for the e¤ects of small party entry 3 on electoral rule choice.
In the same vein, Benoit (2004) studies the endogenous choice of electoral rules by parliamentary parties and develops a theoretical framework that classi…es patterns of electoral rule change in various political systems. He derives conditions for endogenous electoral rule change by rational, seat-maximizing political parties. He predicts that electoral rule change occurs endogenously, when two conditions are met: First, the existence of a coalition of parties willing to agree on electoral rule reform, such that all of them are expected to score seat gains under the newly proposed rule.
Second, the ability of those parties to muster enough votes in the current parliament in order to enact this change.
Finally, in a paper closely related to ours, Ergun (2010) studies the change of electoral rule from plurality to PR 4 assuming o¢ ce-motivated, rational, seat-maximizing parties. He …nds that for any change to take place the following two conditions have to be satis…ed: First, the government must be formed by a coalition. Second, the larger the number of parties and the more equitable the distribution of the spoils amongst them, the more likely the change to a PR rule is. That is, starting from the opposite direction, Ergun adopts the same counter-Duvergerian approach that strategic motivations and party-system structure determine the choice of electoral rules.
Our Contribution
Our paper, building on existing literature of endogenous electoral rule choice (Colomer, 2005) , formalizes the idea that it is parties that choose the electoral rule. It models explicitly how dominant parties 5 coordinate in order to increase their chances of forming a single-party government and consolidate the two-party system by eliminating the role that smaller parties would have other-wise played in a coalition government. Moreover, we extend our understanding on electoral rule choice in two directions: Firstly, we explicitly derive the conditions that allow dominant parties to coordinate in adapting a more majoritarian electoral rule and we identify the exact degree of disproportionality that they introduce into the new rule. Moreover, under mild assumptions, we show that dominant parties agree on a unique (non-proportional) electoral reform proposal.
Secondly, we identify the drivers of this strategic coordination: their desire for o¢ ce and electoral uncertainty. Rather than simply being rational seat-maximizers, parties desire more seats to serve another end: securing the absolute parliamentary majority, allowing them to form a single-party government and enjoy alone the "spoils of o¢ ce."It is their strict preference for single-party governments, in conjunction with electoral uncertainty, that triggers collusion. The latter is a sine qua non condition for aligning dominant parties'incentives, therefore, enabling strategic coordination.
Our modelling approach introduces four new elements in the study of electoral rule choice that were absent from the traditional body of literature: We introduce o¢ ce-motivated parties,
we model electoral rule change in the presence of electoral uncertainty, we introduce ideology as an additional explanatory factor of electoral rule choice, and …nally, we consider a broader set of electoral rules as candidates for the electoral reform process. We discuss each one of them separately.
Firstly, the formulation of parties'preferences incorporates their desire to form a single-party government. Their goal to win as many parliamentary seats as possible serves a dual purpose. On the one hand, it increases their bargaining power, in the case of a coalition formation and their control over the legislative agenda, if in opposition 6 . On the other hand, as their seat share rises above the parliamentary majority threshold, they gain the ability to form a single-party government and enjoy alone the perks of holding o¢ ce (both legislative and executive). Parliamentary seats serve this end and hence, the utility of an extra seat is less when a party commands the absolute majority in the Parliament. As a result, further seat gains have a smaller impact, once the prospect of forming a single-party government is guaranteed. Figure1 (Appendix B) depicts such a utility function. The …rst discontinuity captures parties'received rents when in government (coalition), the second jump re ‡ects their preference for single-party governments, whereas, the change in slope (after one-half) captures the decreasing marginal utility of an extra seat.
Our second element is the introduction of electoral uncertainty. Uncertainty plays a key role in our model since it is the second driving force (the other is their desire for single-party government) that allows dominant parties to collude. In particular, when there is su¢ cient electoral uncertainty 7 , dominant parties might have a common interest to coordinate and adapt a less proportional electoral rule. In other words, we expect that in party-systems with two dominant parties and competitive elections, the major players will collude in order to consolidate the bipartisan system. As a result, a more majoritarian rule will be chosen. In fact, electoral uncertainty is a necessary condition for strategic coordination among dominant parties. The intuition is very simple: without competitive elections, the sure loser will never agree to a more majoritarian electoral rule, since its chances of forming a single-party government are zero.
Introducing parties with ideological preferences, in order to study how ideology interacts with strategic (opportunistic) considerations in the choice of electoral rules, is the third key element of our model. So far, the literature on electoral rule reform has solely focused on rational, seatmaximizing parties, omitting completely from the discussion one extra dimension a¤ecting electoral rule choice: ideology. Therefore, in the last part of our paper we allow for parties having wellde…ned preferences over ideology in a left-right dimension. In such a framework, incentives for strategic coordination over adapting a more majoritarian electoral rule may come into con ‡ict with ideological di¤erences between the two dominant parties. For instance, when the two parties are ideologically very distant and diverge, it seems more plausible that a more proportional rule will be preferred over a majoritarian one. The intuition is that, by sticking to proportionality, dominant parties insure against the risk of a single-party government being formed by a diametrically opposed party. This is con…rmed by some empirical examples (e.g. Italy), where extreme ideological divergence has blocked, until recently, any attempt to substitute the PR with a more majoritarian rule.
The formal analysis of the e¤ect of ideology on electoral reform choice indicates that our 7 In our context, the term su¢ cient electoral uncertainty is meant to imply that elections are competitive and contested by both dominant parties (Andrews and Jackman, 2005). …ndings are dynamically stable. When parties are ideologically divergent we …nd that they adopt proportional representation and when parties compete under proportional representation they tend to adopt divergent political platforms. Moreover when parties are ideologically convergent we …nd that they adopt a majoritarian rule and when parties compete under a majoritarian rule they tend to select ideologically convergent platforms (Cox 1990 and Calvo and Hellwig 2011 show that centripetal incentives are stronger in majoritarian systems while proportional systems are dominated by centrifugal incentives).
Here, we need to clarify that in our set-up, parties in favor of electoral rule reform, need only have expected utility gains, not necessarily realized, ex-post, seat gains (e.g. Benoit, 2004) . This is so, because expected utility incorporates something more than mere seat gains: the change in the probability of forming a single-party government, for the two parties favoring the reform.
Eventually, only one of them will form a single-party government. Yet, in the presence of electoral uncertainty and in the absence of extreme ideological di¤erences, this is utility enhancing for both, in expected terms.
The …nal element, is to consider a broader class of electoral rules (other than PR and FPTP).
Following Sartori (1976) who claims that the most common distortions to the PR rule are the introduction of majority premia and of exclusion clauses 8 , we allow our electoral rule reform proposals to take more generic forms. To capture all possible degrees of disproportionality (from pure PR to FPTP with a unique district) we introduce in the theoretical modeling the, so called, majority premium system (Sartori, 1976) . This rule allocates a fraction of the seats according to PR while, the rest are given to the …rst party as a premium 9 . Hence, by varying the amount of the premium we can simulate electoral rules with di¤erent degrees of disproportionality.
8 E.g. the 10% entry barrier in Turkey, the 5% in Germany and the 3% in Greece. available to all Parties. The vote share of the "minority"Party 3 is assumed to be …xed at a level v 3 , whereas, the vote shares of the other two parties are subject to uncertainty 10 . Formally, the vote share of Party 1 in the coming elections will be modeled as a random variable: As it will be evident in the analysis section, the way we chose to model uncertainty is a reduced form of assuming that the vote share distribution fv 1 ; v 2 ; v 3 g is a random draw from a multivariate
is not required for our results but improves signi…cantly the readability of the formal parts of the paper.
The share of seats that party i 2 N occupies in the new parliament will be de…ned as s
where l will be the applied electoral rule. As stated before, we do not limit our attention to a single electoral rule. Rather, we want to consider the transition from PR to a wider range of possible electoral rules. In order to capture the big diversity of electoral rules existing in the world we will adopt the following mechanism l that is based on a variation of the PR with the use of a majority premium (Sartori, 1976) . That is, l is the proportion of parliamentary seats allocated to the winning party as a bonus (premium). Obviously, l 2 [0; 1] and, thereafter:
and
Given our assumptions, the third party will never be entitled to this bonus as a result of never winning the election. The above seat allocation mechanism allows us to capture a wide variety of electoral rules, from pure PR to mixed systems and FPTP 11 . The …rst part is the proportional allocation of the seats minus the reserved premium, whereas the second part is the bonus given to the winner. The utility of a party i 2 N will be de…ned as:
where 0 r 1 < The …rst part is the utility of party i when it stays in opposition and some other party forms a single-party government. In this case, i's utility depends only on the number of its seats. The second part is the utility of party i when no party can form a single-party government and as a result, a coalition government is formed. Thus, on top of its seat share party i receives extra rents r 1 from holding o¢ ce. Finally, the third part gives the utility of party i when it forms a single-party government. In this case, the payo¤ of the party depends, as before, on its seat share and on o¢ ce rents r 2 (which are obviously higher than the rents i gets in a coalition government).
Parties in this environment care about forming a single-party government ( + r 1 < r 2 ). Moreover, g 2 [0; 1] implies that the utility from an extra seat when the party is not able to form a 11 To see this, consider the case of l = 0. Then, our electoral rule is pure PR, whereas in the case of l = 1, it transforms into a unique district FPTP system (the most disproportional electoral rule possible). For values of l between those two extremes all the other electoral rules can be simulated. Table 1 provides the exact calculations on how our proposed mechanism can replicate the electoral results in Greece (PR with majority premium).
single-party government (s
1=2), is generically higher than the utility from an extra seat when the party is able to form a single-party government 12 .
Solely for analytical and demonstration purposes, in the remainder we will assume that r 1 = g = 0 and r 2 = 1: That is:
This simpli…cation still captures the desire that parties have for single-party governments. Yet, it is open to two main criticisms: First, it implies that a party which has a majority in the parliament does not have any gain by increasing its seat share; and secondly, it suggests that when a party cannot form a single-party government then its utility solely depends on its vote share independently of whether it participates in a coalition government or if it stays in opposition.
In Appendix A, we present results for the general case (0 r 1 < (v i ) > 1=2 that drives our results but, the assumption that the gain from an extra seat should be less for a party that already has a majority in the parliament compared to that when this party is in a coalition government or in opposition. Finally, in Section 4 we will allow the utility of the parties to vary depending on whether they are in a coalition government or just in the opposition. This will be introduced as an ideological component in the utility function which is robust to alternative interpretations such as rent gains from participating in a coalition government as opposed to staying in opposition.
To summarize, our preference structure is a rough but analytically convenient approximation of more general preference structures such that the marginal utility of an extra seat, for a party has the majority in the parliament, is less than the marginal utility when a party is in a coalition government or in opposition.
The Game Structure
After de…ning the preferences of the parties, we proceed with the structure of the electoral reform game. Formally, the game has three stages:
(i) The current rule is l = 0 (pure PR) and the party with the largest share of seats in the current parliament (either party one or party two) shall bear the role of the Proposer of an electoral reform. That is, it will propose l 2 [0; 1].
(ii) Parties vote on the proposal l. If the votes in favor of the reform surpass a given threshold
(given exogenously by the constitution) then, the electoral reform proposal is accepted and the forthcoming elections take place according to the new rule l . In the opposite case, that is, if the proposal does not gather the necessary parliamentary support W , the electoral reform is cancelled and future elections are conducted according to the proportional rule l = 0:
(iii) Elections take place and each party, according to its vote share and the applied electoral rule, l or l = 0, takes its new seat share in the Parliament and computes its utility.
Understanding the Proposer' s Problem
For simplicity, let us assume without any loss in generality, that the Proposer is always Party 1.
That is, we assume that s 
Lemma 1
The minority party never consents to any electoral reform proposal.
Proof. Since the minority party expects to receive the premium l with probability zero, it strictly prefers the PR rule (l = 0). Its expected utility from any electoral rule l 6 = 0 is:
, which is clearly decreasing in l:
Given the above observation, Party 1 will have to secure Party 2's support in order to proceed with an electoral rule reform. That is, it has to propose l 2 arg maxfEu 1 (v 1 ; v 2 ; v 3 ; l)g s.t. In general, since we have assumed that v 3 is …xed and common knowledge and that v 1 = 1 v 2 v 3 , the Proposer faces one source of uncertainty (information about v 1 is equivalent to information about v 2 ). Thus, the proposer's expected utility is given by expression:
and equivalently, Party's 2 expected utility is:
Notice that there exist two critical vote shares. The …rst one, (1 v 3 )=2, de…nes the necessary vote share for one of the two parties to be …rst (and get the premium l). The second,
, is the vote share that the …rst party needs in order to get the majority of seats in the parliament,
the …rst party will have the a majority in the parliament as long as it wins and thus, the expected utility of Party 1 will be:
and for Party 2:
is decreasing in l, an increase in the majority premium (an increase in l) for the party that runs …rst in elections, not only increases its seat gains but, it also increases its chances of obtaining the majority of parliamentary seats and hence, forming a single-party government. It is this dual impact of the electoral rule on parties'utility that makes the electoral reform process such an important strategic decision.
De…nitions
We will classify the results given the following de…nitions.
This is a direct implication of Lemma 1. The "minority" party never consents to an electoral reform. Thus, if a reform is to take place, W must be such that Party 3 cannot block it.
De…nition 2 The electoral reform process is trivial if W s 0 1
When the Proposer (Party 1) has a large enough proportion of seats in the current Parliament, so as to be able to choose the electoral rule at will, we shall call the reform process is a trivial one, since it only depends on the preferences of the Proposer.
De…nition 3 The electoral competition is trivial if either
The above de…nition just describes the case that the probability of Party 1 running …rst in the coming elections is either 1 or 0. In such cases the winning party, which will also receive the premium l, is known with certainty. On the other hand, when electoral competition is non-trivial, both Parties 1 and 2 have a positive probability of winning and thus, getting the majority premium l.
De…nition 4
The Proposer (Party 1) is the "leading" party if and only if:
If a party is expected to run …rst in the elections, then it shall be called the leading party.
is the threshold above which Party 1 is the winner, Party 1 is the leading party if and only if its expected vote share exceeds this threshold. Otherwise, Party 2 is the leading one.
Results
Since we want to study electoral rule choice under uncertainty, we focus on the case of nontrivial electoral competition, in order to ensure that there is enough uncertainty over the electoral outcome. We explore the case of trivial electoral competition in Appendix A. Always assuming that an electoral reform is possible (W 1 v 3 ) we can state the following results.
Proposition 1 When the electoral competition is non-trivial then l 2 f0;
14 This is the main result of this paper. In an environment of electoral uncertainty, the proportionality distortion l that the proposer might introduce into the electoral rule as a majority premium, will be such that it guarantees to the winner the majority of seats in the parliament.
That is, if Party 1, alone or with the support of Party 2, sponsors an electoral rule reform, it will be such that it consolidates the status quo in favor of the two dominant parties. This result is a summary of the next two Propositions. Hence, we restrict further analysis in the following section in order to combine Propositions 1, 2 and 3 together.
We now present two Propositions that build on the previous result and state explicitly the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for an electoral rule change to take place. Before doing so, for expositional ease, we de…ne function f i (a i ; b i ; v 3 ) which measures the expected utility gains (or losses) for a party when there is a change in the electoral rule from l = 0 to l =
Observe that f i ( ) 0 implies that party i prefers l = v 3 1+v 3 to l = 0, which in turn, implies that , it is easily checked that f i ( ) > 0 is always satis…ed). 14 All Proofs in Appendix B.
Proposition 3 When both the electoral competition and the electoral reform process are non-trivial then in order for the Parliament to depart from PR (l = 0) and adapt l = Proof. Note that, in the symmetric case, since
, it is again easily checked that f i ( ) > 0 for every b i ; for i 2 f1; 2g. Then, both conditions (i) and (ii) of Proposition 3 are trivially satis…ed and the result follows immediately.
In the remainder, we provide an idea of the proof, followed by a discussion for each case separately, since this is the main result of the paper. First of all, we note that formally the proof is . That is, in equilibrium, the proposer chooses one of those two strategies (notice that in each case the equilibrium is unique). Moreover, when the electoral reform process is non-trivial, the Proposer faces a constrained maximization program. As a result, Party 1 chooses l in order to maximize its expected utility Eu 1 (v 1 ; v 2 ; v 3 ; l), satisfying at the same time the ICC of Party 2 (f 2 (:) 0) 15 .
Next, we argue why only those two values of l are candidates for an equilibrium. Ideally, the proposer would prefer to propose the PR rule (l = 0), if she knows that she will run second and
, otherwise. Yet, in our environment of electoral uncertainty, the Proposer has to compare the expected loss from proposing l = v 3 1+v 3 and running second (area ABCD in Fig. 4 ) 16 , with the expected loss from winning elections but not being able to form a single-party government because it has proposed l = 0 (area DEFH in Fig. 4 ) 17 . This statement, graphically depicted in Figure 4 , is mathematically expressed by f i ( ), which measures the di¤erence between areas 15 Recall that by Lemma 1 the minority party always prefers the PR rule (l = 0) and never agrees to accept any l 6 = 0. 16 Or equivalently, ABCD is the expected gain from proposing the PR (l = 0) and running second. 17 Or equivalently, DEFH is the expected gain from winning in the election and forming a single party government, as a result of proposing l = v3 1+v3 .
DEFH and ABCD. The same analysis applies for the receiver of the proposal (Party 2) in deciding whether to accept it or not. Now, the intuition behind our result is more clear. Assuming that the electoral reform process is trivial, the proposer proposes l = v 3 1+v 3 whenever the expected bene…t from forming a single-party government (as a result of its proposal) exceeds the expected loss of seats (and utility) whenever it runs second. Otherwise, it proposes l = 0. If the electoral reform is non-trivial, and the proposer is the leading party it always prefers to propose l = v 3 1+v 3
, since for Party 1 expected bene…ts always exceed expected losses 18 . But, when the Proposer faces a constrained maximization program it has to satisfy the ICC of Party 2, which is analogous to the previous inequality for Party 1 (i.e. . But now, it is Party 1 that will propose l = v 3 1+v 3 whenever its expected gain exceeds its expected loss (f 1 (:) 0), despite it not being the leading party. Otherwise it proposes l = 0. This completes our argument.
Discussion and Empirical Evidence
Our results, so far, highlight the following feature. Once expected gains from distorting the PR rule exceed expected losses, the two parties are faced with a strategic decision: What is the desired (optimal) level of distortion (premium l) to be introduced into the PR rule. Their dilemma is summarized in the following question: "Given that the outcome is uncertain, which electoral rule guarantees me a single-party government, if I win, but at the same time minimizes the loss of parliamentary seats in case of defeat?" We already know the answer: it is
. An important implication of this is the fact that the equilibrium outcome is unique. Once the two dominant parties agree to depart from the PR rule, there is a unique value of l 6 = 0 that is proposed and 18 Being a leading party (
2 ) implies f i (:) > 0. But, the reverse is not true. To see this, notice that in the symmetric case (
2 ) we still have f i (:) > 0 for i = 1; 2. Hence, by continuity of f i (:) it is still possible to have f i (:) > 0 even if i is not the leading party.
). In fact, the value of l is such that it is the minimum required majority premium that always guarantees to the winner the prospect of a single-party government. This key feature of our model implies that o¢ ce-motivated parties, not only can agree to distort the PR rule in order to consolidate the two-party system, but they can also agree on a unique new electoral rule. On the other hand, if the two dominant parties agree to disagree, the PR rule (l = 0) is maintained. As a result, we either have a unique electoral reform equilibrium (l =
) reveals that l is increasing in the electoral power of third parties ("minority party" in the language of our model).
This yields an interesting insight in the relationship between new-party entry and electoral rule reform. Although, as stressed in the introduction, our model does not aspire to explore party entry in this set up, the minority party can be viewed as the sum of many small parties, as long as they do not stand any chance of outperforming any of the two dominant ones (v 3 < a i ). As such, our model can accommodate expected new-party entry, modeled as an increase in v 3 , as long as the new entrant is not expected to upset the dominance of the two other parties. Then, we provide a rational choice explanation to the (Riera, 2012) that de…es conventional wisdom 19 Boix asserts that: "[W]henever the new entrants are weak, a majoritarian electoral rule is maintained (or reinforced) regardless of the structure of the old political system." 20 The ENP Index is de…ned as
In our model, given that we always assume that v 3 < 2 ) for i 2 f1; 2g. Then:
Hence, in our model, an increase in v 3 will always result in an increase in the ENP. of endogenous electoral rule choice (Colomer, 2005) by o¤ering a modi…ed version of Colomer's statement, based on the number of dominant parties that matters the most. As long as the number of dominant parties remains unchanged, an increase in the number (or in the electoral power) of smaller (non-winning) parties causes the adaptation of more, not less, majoritarian electoral rules.
Empirically, since l is measuring the degree of disproportionality of the electoral rule, our results imply that we should expect the distribution of applied electoral rules across parliamentary democracies (based on electoral rule disproportionality measured by the Gallagher Index 21 ) to be concentrated around two points: when the Index is equal to 0 (resulting from PR being applied), and when the Index is around 3 (when l = v 3 1+v 3 is applied) 22 . This is exactly what data from 22 OECD countries suggest in Figure 5 , where despite the rough approximation technique that we employ (assuming that all OECD countries have bipartisan systems where the two dominant parties are of equal size), we observe that the outcomes produced by electoral rules are concentrated around two main clusters: results generated by PR rules, and those generated by modi…ed (more disproportional) rules, as our model predicts.
This point clearly hints the idea that, for any given political environment, there exist a unique optimal electoral rule, from the perspective of dominant parties who care about consolidating the current structure of the party-system. In particular, in party-systems dominated by two major parties (such as the majority of OECD countries 23 ) we should observe some convergence in electoral rules, which is consistent with our model's prediction. And in fact, we do observe such a convergence (Fig. 6 ) when we plot the actual electoral rule disproportionality (measured by the Gallagher Index) against the predicted one, by applying our model's (optimal) electoral 21 A commonly used measure of electoral rule disproportionality is the Gallagher Index de…ned as:
If one assumes the symmetric case (i.e. systems with two dominant parties of almost equal size) and replaces the vote shares of dominant parties with their expected ones (i.e. Ev i =
v3
2 ), we can de…ne:
(recall that by Corollary 1 in the symmetric case we always have l = v3 1+v3 ). Otherwise, if l = 0, we can compute G (0) = 0.
22 In our sample of 22 OECD countries, the average vote-share of third parties (other than the two major ones) is 21.7%. Assuming that the two-dominant parties are of equal size (in fact in our sample this is roughly correct), one can compute the Gallagher Index for the symmetric case and obtain the value of 3.23. 23 From the list of 22 OECD democracies we identify the following 16 countries that roughly …t this de…nition: Australia, Austria, Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Japan, Luxembourg, N. Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, UK and USA. The remaining six cases are countries with fragmented party-systems which apply the PR rule.
, for the symmetric case 24 . Despite our rough approximation, since it is true that in some countries the two dominant parties have not been historically perfectly symmetric in terms of vote-shares (e.g. Sweden, Japan), and despite some outliers, namely the countries that are in ‡uenced by the Westminster system or apply the FPTP rule (e.g. Australia, New Zealand, USA, Canada), the …t of our model's predicted Gallagher Index (under the assumptions stated before) against actual data is reassuring.
In order to further check this claim, and identify whether empirical patterns of electoral rule change …t our model, we apply its predictions on actual electoral data from Greece. Greece un- Table 1 presents the actual electoral results, the vote and seat share allocations, the "actual"(l) majority premium 25 and the optimal one (l ). We also report the observed deviations between the actual and the predicted values. In fact, our model seems to perform quite well in predicting the direction of electoral rule change in Greece. As one can observe in the observed gap between the actual and optimal majority premium is shrinking over time. Overall, we observe that the actual and predicted values are moving in the same direction and do not di¤er signi…cantly from each other. That is, both dominant parties in Greece have been quite strategical in choosing the "right"electoral rule, in order to consolidate the bipartisan system and 24 Recall that, in symmetric bipartisan systems (such as most OECD countries) our model predicts that l = v3 1+v3 . By replacing this value to the Gallagher formula G (l ) we can get an expression of G as a function of v 3 (see footnote 20). Then, we can calibrate our model by replacing v 3 with the sum of vote-shares of the remaining (non-dominant) parties, within each country, to obtain a unique, country-speci…c value of the Gallagher Index that our model would have predicted, if our optimally chosen electoral rule (l ) were to be applied. 25 Our model can accomodate a wide range of potential electoral rules. One need only computel =s 1 ṽ1 1 ṽ1 in order to …nd the actual majority premiuml, which corresponds to the value of the premium when we allow the actual seat allocation to be replicated by our model. avoid political power-sharing with smaller parties (single-party governments).
Technical Remarks
On a …nal note, two clari…cations are in order. First, with respect to the structure of the bargaining process. One might worry that the results presented so far critically depend on the fact that bargaining between the two dominant parties does not allow for counter-proposals (we adopt a "take-it-or-leave-it" bargaining protocol). Whereas, this statement would have been generically true in any other context, in this particular set up, enriching the bargaining process plays absolutely no role in driving the results. The reason for this is the convexity of the expected utility function (Eu i (l; v)), with respect to l (Fig. 2 and 3 ). As stressed in Proposition 1, due to convexity of ). And it is also true that by assuming a non-trivial electoral reform process, one of the two parties can always guarantee its most preferred outcome (l = 0), in case there is no agreement between them.
That is, it has a veto power, since it can block the electoral rule reform. Hence, the existence of an alternative bargaining process, where Parties could engage in consecutive counter-proposals is equivalent to our set-up and the results obtained under any such formulation would have been identical. Therefore, for simplicity, but without any loss in generality, we refrain from adapting a more complex bargaining protocol.
Secondly, the same rationale applies when one considers our choice to study only one-sided transitions from the PR rule (l = 0) to more majoritarian ones. Since, as argued above (see also Fig. 2 and 3) , there are only two candidate values of l for an optimum, in equilibrium we must have
. Therefore, regardless of our starting point, be it the PR rule or a more majoritarian one, we should expect to end-up in the same place. Yet, starting from l = (or from any other l 6 = 0 for that matter) would have been much more unintuitive and more di¢ cult to motivate as our chosen starting point. On the other hand, assuming that the PR is the status-quo rule resonates much better with actual data and is much more intuitive. Since we have proved that there exist a unique electoral reform equilibrium, other than the status-quo rule (in our case the PR), the choice of any other rule as a starting point would have yielded identical results.
Ideology and Dynamic Stability
So far, our discussion has attempted to shed some light on how and why electoral rule change takes place in parliamentary democracies, as a result of strategic choice by the parties. Yet, we did not provide an account on how ideology might in ‡uence this choice. And although we do not aspire to conduct an exhaustive analysis on the role of ideology in electoral rule reform, we will provide some results that yield useful insights on the importance of ideology in electoral rule choice. So far, we have shown that the predictions of our model …t well the Greek election data. Nevertheless, there are some notable cases (e.g. Italy), where a two-dominant-party system failed to produce a more majoritarian electoral rule. Practically, from 1945 and until the proposed electoral reform of 1993, Italy used the PR rule. Nonetheless, political competition was dominated by two major parties (PCI and CD 26 ), especially during the 1970s, when they reached the peak of their electoral appeal.
Then, one might expect that according to our predictions, the PR should have been substituted with a more majoritarian rule. We will show, in this extension of the basic model, that this did not happen due to the extreme ideological distance between the two dominant parties in Italy during the Cold War era.
The intuition behind this "Italian Paradox" is that both parties utilized the PR rule as an implicit insurance mechanism against the risk of facing a single-party government formed by an ideologically polar-opposite opponent. That is, strategic incentives to collude were mitigated, or even cancelled o¤, due to extreme ideological divergence. As a result, the PR rule was sustained as an insurance device. Hence, when ideology comes into play, strategic incentives might be reversed.
In the remainder of this section, we built into our model preferences over ideology and explore their e¤ect on electoral rule choice. Nevertheless, we need to stress that the scope of this section is limited to the symmetric case, in order to motivate the "Italian Paradox".
Since we focus on the symmetric case, the two dominant parties are of equal electoral size, in is positioned in the centre, equidistant from the other two. The utility of a party i 2 N shall be de…ned as:
Clearly, s But given symmetry, it is equally likely that the major partner in any coalition government will be one of the two dominant parties. Hence, in expected terms, the ideology of the median will be implemented 29 . That is, = 0, which in our particular case happens to coincide with the ideology of the centrist party x 3 .
For demonstration simplicity we assume that " = 1 (in the Appendix we provide equivalent results about any " 2 [0; 1]). That is, the two dominant parties occupy polar opposite positions in the ideological spectrum. Thus, the model exhibits maximum ideological divergence. It is interesting to compare the results of this special case with the results of the symmetric case of the standard version of our model, where we have implicitly assumed that " = 0 (no ideological component present). 28 One can think of a coalition government distributing the ministerial portfolios to the parties based on their parliamentary strength. 29 We stress that this statement is not an assumption. It is trivially derived when one considers that the ideology of the median is the Condorcet winner.
Proposition 4 Assume symmetry and a non-trivial electoral reform process. Then, (i) when " = 0 the optimal choice of electoral rule is l = v 3 1+v 3 , (ii) when " = 1, the optimal choice is the PR rule
This simple example demonstrates the role of ideology in the strategic choice of electoral rule.
Whereas, under complete ideological convergence the two dominant parties were always able to collude and substitute the PR rule with a more majoritarian one (see Corollary 1 for the symmetric case), when the ideological distance between the two dominant parties is maximized, the incentives to collude disappear. On the contrary, they have an incentive to use the PR rule as an implicit insurance mechanism, in case they lose elections. And although they still care about forming a single-party government, their risk-aversion over the prospect of their polar-opposite ideological opponent doing the same forces them to stick with the PR rule. This could potentially explain why Italy never departed from the PR, especially during the 1970s, when ideological divergence between the communists and the christian-democrats was at its peak. Moreover, after the collapse of the iron curtain, the subsequent dissolution of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) resulted in a signi…cant decrease in its electoral power. As a result, the ideological distance between the left and right shrunk and a more moderate party emerged from PCI, as the dominant party in the center-left. This occurred in the 1992 elections. A proposal to adopt a more majoritarian electoral rule followed immediately afterwards (1993).
Going back to the Greek Parliamentary election data, on Table 1 and Fig. 7 and 8 , we can see yet another application of the electoral rule reform as insurance against an ideologically distant opponent. During the 1980s political competition was dominated by corruption allegations and high ideological divergence between the two dominant parties, the governing socialist PASOK and the conservative opposition ND. The governing party fearing the prospect of a single-party government being formed by the opposition, in the forthcoming elections, amended the electoral rule to pure PR in 1988. It did so to impede the formation of a single-party government and clearly, it achieved its objective (see Fig. 8 ). This is depicted as a steep dive in Figure 7 . It is clear that during those electoral periods, the electoral rule was more proportional than before. We attribute this larger degree of proportionality to the increase in the degree of ideological divergence that was observed back then. Hence, empirical evidence from both Greece and Italy seem to con…rm our theoretical …ndings and intuition.
On a …nal note, we need to stress that this attempt to account for ideology is far from being complete. In this paper, we have focused on the symmetric case, both in terms of electoral strength and in terms of ideological proximity. We also made particular assumptions about the coalition formation process. These assumptions might …t the particular cases of Greece 30 or Italy. However, our model does not explore what happens when symmetry is dropped. While acknowledging this limitation, we stress that the model's predictions, even in its simplest form, are in line with empirical observations and intuition. Moreover, it allows us to isolate the impact of ideology on electoral rule choice. Of course, more analysis is warranted on the impact of ideology on electoral rule choice. We leave this to future research.
Dynamic Stability
The static nature of our model raises some concerns regarding the stability of the equilibrium electoral rules that we identify. We will brie ‡y argue that the inclusion of an ideological component in the game as presented above guarantees the dynamic stability of the model. If parties know that the electoral rule that they will design will have a long life length then the uncertainty that we assume about the next elections can be easily interpreted as the distribution of the expected outcomes for the many elections that will take place under a certain electoral rule. Moreover, in this dynamic context, the symmetric scenario that we consider above (the scenario in which both parties are expected to win the next election with equal probability) can be interpreted as each of the major parties expecting to win half of the times during the period in which this electoral rule will be applied (data con…rm that in most countries each of the two largest parties won approximately half of the elections in any arbitrary long period). If at the time of the electoral rule choice the ideologies of the two major parties diverge then proposition 4 dictates that they will choose PR and when parties compete under a PR rule they tend to adopt highly polarized political platforms (see for example Cox 1990 and Calvo and Hellwig 2011). On the other hand, if at the time of electoral rule choice the two major parties exhibit ideological proximity then they choose a majoritarian electoral rule (l =
) and when parties compete under majoritarian electoral rules they tend to adopt more convergent platforms (this holds especially for major parties; see Calvo and Hellwig 2011) . So what we observe is that we have two stable dynamic paths. PR leads to platform polarization and platform polarization leads to PR. Majoritarian systems lead to platform convergence and platform convergence leads to majoritarian systems.
Conclusions
The main …nding of our paper is the strategic coordination among dominant parties in adapting a more majoritarian than the PR electoral rule, in order to consolidate the two-party system and eliminate the role of smaller parties. Furthermore, our model identi…es the three driving factors that allow this collusion between dominant parties, in the form of introducing a majority premium to the PR, to take place. The …rst key element is su¢ cient electoral uncertainty. The second is their desire to form a single-party government. When elections are competitive and both dominant parties have enough chances of winning, they have incentives to cooperate in order to eliminate the impact of third parties, in the same spirit that big …rms would like to drive smaller competitors out of the market. That is, dominant parties have incentives to consolidate their position in the party system, since the terms of political competition are obviously favorable to them under the status quo. But, for collusion to take place the two conditions mentioned above are indispensable. The desire for o¢ ce and single-party governments generates the incentive to distort the proportionality of the electoral rule, whereas electoral uncertainty allows for those incentives to be aligned, creating enough room for collusion.
The third, and more subtle, factor is ideology. Driven by empirical observation, suggesting that are party-systems in which the two dominant parties do not cooperate to introduce a more majoritarian electoral rule, we identify ideological proximity between dominant parties as the …nal necessary condition for collusion. Hence, we introduce an ideology component, as an extra dimension, into the preferences of the parties. We show that, a third key condition was implicitly assumed in order for the two dominant parties to coordinate: ideological proximity. That is, when ideological distance between the two dominant parties is large, our model predicts that dominant parties'strategic incentives to agree on a more majoritarian rule are reversed. The fear that their polar-opposite ideological opponent will form a single-party government dominates over their desire for o¢ ce. Hence, they utilize the choice of the electoral rule as an insurance device against the risk of having an ideologically opposed single-party government. In the case of maximum ideological divergence, our key result states that both parties are better o¤ by sticking to the PR rule. This can explain, to some extend, the prevalence of PR rule in some bipartisan systems and backs up the dynamic stability of our results.
6 Appendix A
The General Case
Assume that:
where 0 r 1 < 1 2 + r 1 < r 2 and g 2 [0; 1] and that a 1 = a 2 < 1 2
(parties 1 and 2 split the bonus when they tie) and that
Therefore, the expected utility of party 1 (since parties 1 and 2 are symmetric we derive the outcome of the game only by studying party 1) from an electoral rule l
is given by:
and from an electoral rule l > v 3 1+v 3 is given by:
We compute: and that
holds if and only if:
Moreover we observe that
occurs if and only if:
That is, for su¢ ciently high r 2 (su¢ ciently high rents from forming a single party government) and for su¢ ciently low g (su¢ ciently low gain from an extra seat when the party already has a majority of votes in the parliament) both parties maximize their expected utilities by applying the
To conclude let us state that there are three more possibilities. For r 2 su¢ ciently low the most probable outcome is that parties will choose l = 0 (PR). There is a very small set of parameter values 31 , given by: :
Finally, in the extreme case where both r 2 and g are very large, the …rst-past-the-post electoral rule (l = 1) may be selected by the parties.
Insu¢ cient Electoral Uncertainty
When the electoral competition is trivial we can state the following results.
Proposition 5 When both the electoral reform process and the electoral competition are trivial and the proposer is: (i)the leading party, then l maxf0;
1=2 a 1 1 a 1 g, (ii) not the leading party, then
31 This claim is derived from parametric analysis using Mathematica.
Proof. Since the electoral reform process is trivial, Party 1 faces an unconstrained maximization program. Moreover, since the electoral competition is trivial, if it is the leading party, its expected utility is given by:
Then, it proposes l such that it secures with certainty the majority of the seats in the new parliament. That is, it sets a 1 (1 l ) + l = 1=2, which implies that s l 1 = 1=2 , 8a 1 . Then, solving for l yields the result. If it is not the leading party,
, which is strictly decreasing in l. Hence, l = 0. This completes the proof.
This result can be viewed as the simplest case scenario. The idea behind this proposition is very simple. Since the electoral reform process is trivial, the proposer holds enough seats in the current parliament to enact any electoral rule reform, without the need to satisfy the ICC of Party 2.
Hence, the proposer just chooses l in order to maximize expected utility. Given that the electoral competition is trivial, if the Proposer is not the leading party (i.e. sure loser) it proposes that the PR rule is not amended (l = 0). As a result, the electoral rule does not change. Otherwise, it proposes l maxf0; On the other hand, if it is not the leading party it can never get the premium l , making its utility strictly decreasing on l . Hence, any distortion to the PR rule is not desirable.
Proposition 6
When the electoral competition is trivial but the electoral reform process is nontrivial, then l = 0:
Proof. Since electoral competition is trivial one party is a sure loser and the other is a sure winner. That is, for i = 1 or 2,
, which is strictly decreasing in l. Hence, one party always prefers l = 0 but the other, as shown in Proposition 1 prefers l maxf0;
1=2 a 1 1 a 1 g. Since the electoral reform process is non-trivial, the two parties have to agree on the electoral reform. So, the only equilibrium is l = 0.
The idea that drives the result is that in this case there is no room for collusion. The strategic incentives of the two dominant parties do not align, because there is no uncertainty over the outcome of the electoral competition. The leading party will always prefer a value of l > 0 but the other party will always reject this proposal because its utility is strictly decreasing in l: Since the electoral reform is non-trivial and requires the consent of both dominant parties, it is obvious why no electoral rule reform will ever be enacted by this parliament. That is, the status-quo is maintained and PR persists as the electoral rule (i.e. l = 0). 
Arbitrary degree of ideological di¤erentiation
As before, a critical value for l is l =
; 1] the above expression collapses to 34 :
2 . Finally, we note that apart from imposing symmetry the rest of the model remains as speci…ed in Section 2. 
. Clearly,
2 < 0 which implies that for every l 2 [0;
] the following should be satis…ed:
0 . Then the result follows, since there is a unique candidate for a maximum, namely l = 0, due to the fact that Eu 1 (v 1 ; v 2 ; v 3 ; l) is decreasing for every l.
For part (ii) we need to show that for every " > " 00 , Eu 1 (v 1 ; v 2 ; v 3 ; l) is concave in [0;
That is we compute: and we are in case (iii).
For part (iii), we just note that for any other value of "; such that " " 00 ,
. Therefore, as shown in the proof of Proposition 1, the two candidates for a maximum are the same, namely l 2 f0; PR is used as an insurance against the prospect of facing a single-party government with polar- g, is quite easy. In the …rst part of the proof we shall demonstrate that, for both parties the exact bonus l that maximizes their expected utility is either 0 or
Then given this result, we will o¤er a trivial argument to show that if both parties maximize their expected utility with a bonus
, this speci…c electoral reform takes place, and in case at least one maximizes its expected utility with l = 0 no electoral reform takes place.
For the …rst part of the proof we need to prove that the expected utility of party 1 is convex in l 2 [0;
], strictly convex in a subset of [0;
] and decreasing in ( 1=2 l
] we have that Eu 1 (v 1 ; v 2 ; v 3 ; l) = 35 Parametric analysis using Mathematica reveals that the region [" 00 ; " 0 ] represents a very small fraction of parameter values; it is extremely unlikely that parties will agree on an electoral rule di¤erent to 0 or
; 1] we have that 
Just, as before
], and Proposition 3. We will be using an argument analogous to Proposition 2. Let us …rst note that, in this case, the duality of the conditions is due to the fact that the proposer faces the constrained version of the maximization problem (given that the electoral reform process requires the consent of both parties). That is for l = 0 to change to l = Proposition 4. Firstly, symmetry implies that the electoral competition is non-trivial as well.
Secondly, we note that for every l 2 ( The Degree of Electoral Rule Disproportionality 
